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What happens to others profoundly influences our own behavior. Such other-regarding outcomes 
can drive observational learning, as well as motivate cooperation, charity, empathy, and even 
spite. Vicarious reinforcement may serve as one of the critical mechanisms mediating the 
influence of other-regarding outcomes on behavior and decision-making in groups. Here we 
show that rhesus macaques spontaneously derive vicarious reinforcement from observing 
rewards given to another monkey, and that this reinforcement can motivate them to subsequently 
deliver or withhold rewards from the other animal. We exploited Pavlovian and instrumental 
conditioning to associate rewards to self (M1) and/or rewards to another monkey (M2) with 
visual cues. M1s made more errors in the instrumental trials when cues predicted reward to 
M2 compared to when cues predicted reward to M1, but made even more errors when cues 
predicted reward to no one. In subsequent preference tests between pairs of conditioned 
cues, M1s preferred cues paired with reward to M2 over cues paired with reward to no one. 
By contrast, M1s preferred cues paired with reward to self over cues paired with reward to 
both monkeys simultaneously. Rates of attention to M2 strongly predicted the strength and 
valence of vicarious reinforcement.  These patterns of behavior, which were absent in non-social 
control trials, are consistent with vicarious reinforcement based upon sensitivity to observed, 
or counterfactual, outcomes with respect to another individual. Vicarious reward may play 
a critical role in shaping cooperation and competition, as well as motivating observational 
learning and group coordination in rhesus macaques, much as it does in humans. We propose 
that vicarious reinforcement signals mediate these behaviors via homologous neural circuits 
involved in reinforcement learning and decision-making.
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  positive or negative outcomes to others (Bandura et al., 1963; Fehr 
and Fischbacher, 2003; Mobbs et al., 2009). Human social emotions 
associated with vicarious reward and punishment, such as fairness 
and envy, appear early in ontogeny, and their derangement in men-
tal disorders like psychopathy can have devastating consequences 
(Kiehl, 2006).
Such observations endorse the idea that neural mechanisms 
supporting vicarious reinforcement are derived specializations of 
the human brain, which support complex social behavior includ-
ing observational learning, cooperation, and even altruism (Fehr 
and Fischbacher, 2003). Though highly specialized for complex 
social behavior in humans, these mechanisms appear to have deep 
evolutionary roots. Behavioral and neurobiological evidence dem-
onstrate rudimentary forms of fictive, observational, and social 
learning in non-human animals. Rhesus macaques, for example, 
learn from fictive outcomes and this process appears to be sup-
ported by the same circuitry mediating fictive learning in humans 
(Hayden et al., 2009). In some species, learning to perform a task 
is facilitated by watching others learn the same task (Zentall and 
Levine, 1972; Zentall et al., 1996; Drea and Wallen, 1999; Subiaul 
et al., 2004; Whiten et al., 2009). Chimpanzees are capable of learn-
ing to use complex tools by observing others (Tomasello et al., 
IntroductIon
Reinforcement learning provides a powerful mechanism for asso-
ciating stimuli and actions with the direct experience of reward 
and punishment (Rescorla and Wagner, 1972; Schultz et al., 1997; 
Sutton and Barto, 1998). Behavioral and neurobiological evidence 
indicate that human behavior also depends on outcomes that have 
not been directly experienced. For example, fictive, or counterfac-
tual, learning describes sensitivity to reward outcomes for options 
that were not chosen, were merely observed, or were even imag-
ined (Byrne, 2002; Lohrenz et al., 2007; Epstude and Roese, 2008). 
Fictive learning can be described formally in terms analogous to 
reinforcement learning (Lohrenz et al., 2007), and may depend on 
overlapping neural circuitry (Lohrenz et al., 2007; Hayden et al., 
2009; Mobbs et al., 2009).
Observing what happens to others also powerfully shapes human 
learning and behavior (Berger, 1962; Bandura and McDonald, 1963; 
Bandura et al., 1963). Such other-regarding outcomes can drive 
observational learning (Mobbs et al., 2009; Jeon et al., 2010), and 
motivate other-regarding behaviors such as cooperation and char-
ity, as well as spite and schadenfreude (Takahashi et al., 2009). The 
“warm glow” hypothesis (Andreoni, 1990) suggests that vicari-
ous reward and punishment motivates individuals to prefer either 
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choices. These findings demonstrate context-dependent, vicarious 
reinforcement guides decision-making with respect to others in 
rhesus macaques.
MaterIals and Methods
General Procedures
All procedures were approved by the Duke University Institutional 
Animal Care and Use Committee and were designed and conducted 
in compliance with the Public Health Service’s Guide for the Care 
and Use of Animals. All rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) used in 
the study were genetically unrelated, middle-ranked males (mean 
age and SD, 9 ± 3.7), and none of M1–M2 pairs were cagemates. All 
monkeys involved in this study received at least 20 ml/kg of liquid 
daily in addition to fluid earned in the experiment.
Horizontal and vertical eye positions were sampled (1000 Hz) by 
an infrared eye-monitoring camera system (SR Research Eyelink). 
Stimuli  were  controlled  by  a  computer  running  Matlab  using 
PsychToolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997). All experiments were 
carried out in a dimly lit room to ensure visibility of M1 and M2. 
Both M1 and M2 were head-restrained during the experiments. M2 
was always situated diagonally across from M1 at a 45° eccentricity 
to the right from the center of M1’s screen, and they faced each 
of their own display screens, which were located at a 90° angle 
from one another (Figure 1A). The location of M2 (center of the 
face) was mapped empirically prior to experiments using M1’s eye 
positions. In the chair/juice control, an empty primate chair with 
an operating juice tube and a depository bottle replaced M2. The 
depository bottle was placed in the same space that would otherwise 
be occupied by M2’s mouth region (all else in the control were 
identical to the M1–M2 condition).
Solenoid valves that delivered the liquid rewards were placed in 
another room to prevent monkeys from forming secondary associa-
tions between solenoid clicks and different reward types. We also 
included a separate solenoid designated for RNONE that only pro-
duced clicks but delivered no fluid. Masking white noise was always 
played in the experimental room. We used a relatively large juice 
reward size (0.5–1 ml) per successful trial in order to clearly dem-
onstrate to M1 that M2 received juice rewards on RBOTH and ROTHER 
trials. The reward size remained constant across different reward 
conditions within each block. More specifically, the fluid-restricted 
actor and recipient monkeys received, on average, 250 ml of liquid 
in the form of cherry juice. The amount of fluid intake across dif-
ferent experimental sessions only fluctuated within ∼50 ml. During 
the days without experimental sessions, the monkeys drank up to 
500 ml ad lib. or more, which demonstrates the high motivational 
level. Furthermore, they were very motivated by this reinforce-
ment schedule, given that they participated in the experiments 
and continued to perform trials for about 2–3 h without stopping.
BehavIoral tasks and analysIs
The behaviors from two actor monkeys were examined. The tasks 
were initially developed for neurophysiological investigations, and 
therefore we limited the number of the actor monkeys to 2, which 
is the standard and practical convention for neurophysiological 
studies. This convention, however, weakens the generalizability of 
the study. To address this to our best, the current study also reports 
the main findings and statistics separately for the two monkeys. A 
1987), and their observational learning seems to be contingent on 
the associative strength of observed action and outcome (Crawford 
and Spence, 1921). Observing another mouse receive a shock can 
drive fear conditioning in the observer, and this observational fear 
conditioning depends on affective pain circuitry that has been 
implicated in empathy in humans (Jeon et al., 2010).
Whether mere observation of rewarding events occurring to 
another individual can drive the expression of social preferences 
in non-human animals, as proposed by the “warm glow” model, 
however, remains debated. Some have argued that the expression 
of other-regarding preferences in humans reflects the evolution 
of mechanisms that promote cooperative reproduction, but the 
evidence for other-regarding behaviors in cooperatively breeding 
animals remains controversial (Burkart et al., 2007; de Waal et al., 
2008; Lakshminarayanan and Santos, 2008; Massen et al., 2010). 
Others have argued that only those species most closely related to 
humans, namely chimpanzees and bonobos, possess the derived 
features of human biology and cognition, in particular “theory of 
mind” (Call and Tomasello, 2008), express other-regarding prefer-
ences, but again the evidence for such behavior in apes remains 
inconclusive (Tomasello et al., 2003; Silk et al., 2005).
We  hypothesize  instead  that  cooperation  and  competition 
endemic to group life favors the evolution of neural circuits tuned 
to extract information about the experiences of others, and that 
these circuits serve as the core building blocks for the develop-
ment of observational learning and other-regarding behaviors, 
which reach their fullest expression in our own species. As a first 
behavioral test of this idea, we probed the impact of vicarious 
reinforcement on subsequent decisions made by rhesus macaques 
with respect to other monkeys. Rhesus monkeys observe others 
to gather social information (Cheney and Seyfarth, 1990), dis-
play sensitivity to fictive outcomes in non-social settings (Hayden 
et al., 2009), show rudimentary understanding of the intentions of 
others (Flombaum and Santos, 2005), care for kin (Maestripieri, 
1994), and may give up foods to alleviate pain in conspecifics 
(Masserman et al., 1964). We hypothesized that such behaviors, 
as well as naturally occurring behaviors such as social grooming, 
alliance formation, and group territorial defense, derive from fun-
damental vicarious reinforcement mechanisms similar to those 
guiding social behavior in humans.
To test this hypothesis, we capitalized on simple Pavlovian and 
instrumental conditioning to associate liquid rewards to self and 
rewards to another monkey with a set of visual cues, and subse-
quently tested for preferences amongst these cues in a two alter-
native-forced choice task to infer underlying reward associations. 
Subsequent preference tests between cues revealed a preference to 
reward the other monkey rather than no one, but a preference to 
withhold reward from the other when choosing between rewarding 
self or both monkeys simultaneously. Crucially, monkeys showed 
no preferences amongst the cues when the other monkey was 
removed from the room and replaced with a juice collection bot-
tle, confirming the social dependence of vicarious reinforcement 
and thus ruling out simple fictive learning as an explanation for 
the observed behavior. Preferences amongst cues were predicted by 
the relative subjective value of each cue, as inferred from the time it 
took to initiate choosing each option, as well as the frequency with 
which the actor monkey looked at the recipient monkey   following www.frontiersin.org  March 2011  | Volume 5  | Article 27  |  3
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contained a white outline around the same cues used to convey 
the same reward outcomes on instrumental trials (Figure 1C). 
On Pavlovian trials, cue onset marked the end of the fixation 
requirement (i.e., free to look anywhere), and the appropriate 
reward outcome was delivered. On instrumental trials, however, 
extinction of the cue was followed by another 200 ms of central 
fixation before a white target stimulus (1° diameter) appeared at 
one of eight random locations (eccentricity of 8°). M1 had 1.5 s 
to shift gaze to the target with in 3.4°. After successful target 
acquisition, the appropriate reward was delivered. At the onset of 
reward, M1 was free to look anywhere in the setup before the next 
trial began for 1 s. Rewards were delivered at approximately the 
same time for the Pavlovian and instrumental trials after match-
ing the reward timings of the previously occurred instrumental 
trials (requiring motor responses) to the subsequent Pavlovian 
trials on a trial-by-trial basis. Data from 120 ± 57 (median ± SD) 
and 173 ± 59 correct trials were collected for each pair and the 
non-social control, respectively.
In the preference task (Figure 1C, bottom), M1 again began 
each trial by shifting gaze to the fixation stimulus. After 200 ms 
of central fixation, two of the previously learned cues from the 
total of eight M1–M2 and two M1–chair/juice pairs were used in 
the study. Of these, three M1–M2 pairs and two chair/juice controls 
(for each M1) were subjected to both Pavlovian and instrumental 
conditioning trials with a novel stimulus set for each pair. The 
remaining five M1–M2 pairs were tested based on already learned 
cue-reward associations from the conditioning trials (i.e., from the 
three M1–M2 pairs). The complete set of visual cues used is shown 
in Table 1. One actor monkey (MY) served as M1 first then was 
also tested as M2 at the very end, whereas the other actor monkey 
(MO) was tested as M2 at the very beginning, then served as M1 
from then on (see box in Figure 3B for the complete list of pair-
ings). Context-dependent preferences were evident in both M1s 
(see main text for statistics). Other monkeys involved in the study 
only served as M2.
The  conditioning  task  consisted  of  randomly  interleaved 
Pavlovian (Figure 1B, top) and instrumental conditioning trials 
(Figure 1B, middle). On both trial types, M1 initiated the trial by 
shifting gaze to a central stimulus (0.7° × 0.7°). After 200 ms of 
fixation, a cue (5° × 5°) of different shape and/or color appeared 
in the center and remained on for 1 s on Pavlovian trials and for 
300 ms on instrumental trials. Visual cues on Pavlovian trials 
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Figure 1 | experimental setup and behavioral paradigms. (A) An actor 
monkey (M1) performed behavioral tasks in the presence of a recipient monkey 
(M2) in a dimly lit room. (B) Typical stimuli used for the monkey–monkey 
(M1–M2) and monkey–chair/juice (M1–C/J) conditions. See Table 1 for all the 
stimuli used. (C) Behavioral tasks. Top, Pavlovian conditioning task. Middle, 
instrumental conditioning task. Bottom, preference task. Pavlovian and 
instrumental conditioning trials were randomly interleaved. Preference trials 
were run to test M1’s vicariously conditioned preferences.Frontiers in Neuroscience  | Decision Neuroscience    March 2011  | Volume 5  | Article 27  |  4
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window spanning from the center of M2’s face during the peri-
reward free-viewing period (from the start of reward delivery up 
to 1 s after reward the completion of the delivery; Figure 1B). On 
non-social control trials, this region was occupied by an operating 
juice tube and a depository bottle situated in the neckplate of our 
primate chairs.
results
Monkeys exhIBIt vIcarIous reInforceMent
Two adult male rhesus monkeys served as actors (M1) and five adult 
male rhesus monkeys served as recipients (M2; see Materials and 
Methods). M1 and M2 sat across from each other (Figure 1A), and 
each viewed his own computer screen, which displayed visual cues. 
On Pavlovian trials (Figure 1B, top), M1 and M2 both saw the same 
cue at the center of the display, and juice rewards were delivered 
to M1 (RSELF), M2 (ROTHER), both M1 and M2 (RBOTH), or neither 
(RNONE) depending on the color or shape of the cue (Figure 1C; 
Table 1). On instrumental trials (Figure 1B, middle), M1 and M2 
again both saw the same cue and a neutral target appeared, to which 
M1 had to shift gaze for subsequent delivery of juice reward to M1, 
M2, both M1 and M2, or neither.
Error rates (failure to maintain fixation after cue onset or 
inaccurate gaze shift to the peripheral target; see Materials and 
Methods)  on  the  instrumental  trials  demonstrated  that  M1 
discriminated among the four reward conditions (Figure 2A). 
For both instrumental conditions in which M1 received direct 
fluid reward, error rates were indistinguishable whether or not 
M2 was also rewarded (RSELF and RBOTH; p = 0.54, Wilcoxon sign 
rank test; n = 57 sessions; Figure 2A). In contrast, M1 made 
significantly more errors on trials with cues that did not result 
in direct fluid reward to self compared with trials displaying 
cues that predicted direct fluid reward to self (RSELF or RBOTH 
versus ROTHER or RNONE; all p < 0.00001, Wilcoxon sign rank test; 
n = 57 sessions; Figure 2A).
Notably, M1 continued to perform instrumental trials with 
cues predicting reward to M2 (ROTHER) or no one (RNONE) despite 
the fact that he was never rewarded in either case and error 
rates clearly showed that M1 did not prefer these cues [error 
rates: 71.0 ± 4.3% (mean ± SEM per session) and 84.8 ± 2.8%, 
respectively]. Critically, M1 made significantly fewer errors when 
the cue predicted a fluid reward for M2 compared with when 
conditioning task appeared as targets at two of eight random 
locations 8° from the central fixation stimulus, separated by 180° 
(e.g., Figures 1A,B, bottom). Upon target onset, M1 shifted gaze 
to one or the other target, and the reward outcome associated 
with that chosen target was delivered. M1 had 1.5 s to shift 
gaze to the target (±3.4°). Data from 229 ± 88 and 122 ± 78 
correct trials were collected for each pair and the non-social 
control, respectively.
For both tasks, when an error occurred (i.e., failure to maintain 
fixation after cue onset or inaccurate gaze shift to the peripheral tar-
get), the trial was aborted, and a white error square (14.2° × 14.2°) 
appeared on the screen for 1.5 s. On Pavlovian conditioning trials, 
errors were defined as failures to maintain fixation after acquiring 
the fixation point to start a trial. Because these errors were inde-
pendent of any reward contingencies (i.e., before cue onset), we did 
not consider them here. On instrumental conditioning and choice 
trials, errors were defined as either failures to maintain fixation in 
the beginning of a trial or breaking fixation or not acquiring a target 
after the reward contingencies were revealed (after cue onset). In 
practice, almost all errors resulted from monkeys looking up and 
away from the computer monitor. Error trials were excluded from 
further analyses.
We calculated a vicarious reinforcement index (VRI) by comput-
ing the difference between the frequency of choosing one option 
(nA) and the other (nB) and then normalizing the difference by 
the sum:
VRI
A B
A B
=
−
+
n n
n n
.
 
(1)
In the Self/Both context, nA and nB were the number of RBOTH and 
RSELF choices, respectively, whereas in the Other/None context, 
they were ROTHER and RNONE, respectively. The VRI always ranged 
from −1 to 1, with 1 corresponding to M1 always choosing the 
prosocial option (either RBOTH or ROTHER), −1 corresponding to 
M1 always choosing the non-prosocial option (either RSELF or 
RNONE), and 0 corresponding to M1 choosing each of the alterna-
tives equally often.
Saccade reaction times (RTs; time from target onset to move-
ment onset) were computed using a 20°/s velocity crossing thresh-
old on each trial. The frequency of M1 looking at M2 was computed 
by counting the number of gaze shifts made by M1 into a 25° × 25° 
Table 1 | Stimulus–reward pairs used in the experiments.
Stimulus–reward associations  Conditioned pairs on the  Preference tested pairs on e 
  conditioning trials (M1–M2)  the preferenctrials (M1–M2)
rSeLF  rBOTH  rOTHer  rNONe     
          MY–MD  MO–MD  MO–MB
        MY–MD  MY–ML  MO–ML 
        MO–MD  MY–MO  MO–MS 
        MO–MY    MO–MY 
        MY–C/J    MY–C/J 
        MO–C/J    MO–C/J 
Stimuli used for all individual monkey–monkey (e.g., MY–MD) pairs and monkey–chair/juice (e.g., MY–C/J) controls. On Pavlovian trials, a white outline was present 
on these cues (e.g., see Figure 1C).www.frontiersin.org  March 2011  | Volume 5  | Article 27  |  5
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context-dePendent ManIfestatIon of vIcarIous 
reInforceMent
Subsequently, we used a two alternative forced task (preference task; 
Figure 1B bottom) to directly test the hypothesis that observing 
another monkey receiving a reward is vicariously reinforcing. In the 
preference task, M1 chose between pairs of previously conditioned 
cues (RSELF versus RBOTH, or ROTHER versus RNONE) by shifting gaze to 
one of them. Critically, rewards were matched between the available 
choices in each condition – that is, M1 chose between ROTHER and 
RNONE [Other/None condition (purely vicarious context); M1 never 
directly rewarded with juice] or between RBOTH and RSELF (Self/Both 
condition; M1 always rewarded with juice). We hypothesized that 
cues would acquire value vicariously via Pavlovian and instrumen-
tal conditioning, and that differential cue values would be expressed 
as systematic preferences in this choice task.
As expected, error rates in the preference task were consistent 
with a preference for receiving direct fluid reward in the Self/Both 
condition (error rate: 0.8 ± 0.2%; n = 64 sessions), compared 
to no fluid reward in the Other/None condition, in which M1 
was never rewarded (12.6 ± 1.8%; p < 0.00001, Wilcoxon sign 
rank test; n = 64). Remarkably, however, M1 performed about 
88% of trials in which he was not directly rewarded with fluid. 
Again, as in the conditioning trials, M1 made significantly fewer 
errors during the non-social control (n = 13 sessions) compared 
to when M2 was present (p < 0.001, Wilcoxon rank sum test). M1 
was significantly more willing to complete trials which resulted 
in no reward to M1 during the preference trials compared to the 
Pavlovian conditioning trials (correct rate: 87.4 ± 1.8% versus 
22.1 ± 2.7%, p < 0.00001, Wilcoxon rank sum test). This is con-
sistent with prior observations in rhesus macaques that voluntary 
choices are more motivating than simple operant responses in the 
conditioning tasks (Suzuki, 1999).
The critical question was whether M1 acquired an intrinsi-
cally  rewarding  preference,  through  vicarious  reinforcement, 
for rewarding M2 in the absence of rewarding self (ROTHER). The 
choice preferences of M1 demonstrated that cues indeed acquired 
strong motivational associations even when M1 received no direct 
reward. M1 consistently preferred ROTHER (82.5 ± 1.1%) over RNONE 
(17.5%; p < 0.00001, Wilcoxon signed rank test; n = 64 sessions), 
even though M1 was never directly rewarded with juice in this 
context (Figure 3A). Critically, this preference was absent in the 
non-social control when M2 was removed from the experimental 
room and replaced by an operating juice tube and a collection bot-
tle [Figure 3A; 54.7 ± 3.8 (ROTHER) versus 45.3% (RNONE), p = 0.17, 
Wilcoxon sign rank test; n = 13]. In contrast, in the Self/Both 
context, M1 consistently preferred RSELF (80.3 ± 1.0%) over RBOTH 
(19.7%; p < 0.00001, Wilcoxon sign rank test; n = 64), even though 
either choice led to the same physical juice reward for M1 simul-
taneously (Figure 3A). This pattern was again absent in the non-
social control [Figure 3A; 48.3 ± 1.3 (RSELF) versus 51.7% (RBOTH), 
p = 0.06, Wilcoxon sign rank test; n = 13]. We observed the context-
dependent patterns of behavior in each M1 separately [percentage 
of choosing ROTHER (MY and MO): 86.7 ± 1.5 and 80.7 ± 1.4%; 
percentage of choosing RSELF: 85.4 ± 1.6 and 79.6 ± 1.1%].
We further quantified M1’s preferences by calculating a VRI, a 
contrast ratio varying from −1 to 1, with positive values indicat-
ing preferences for ROTHER over RNONE (Other/None condition) 
the cue predicted no one would receive a fluid reward, indicat-
ing a reinforcing property to observing M2 receive a reward 
(p < 0.00001, Wilcoxon sign rank test; n = 57; Figure 2A). This 
pattern of systematically lower error rates on ROTHER compared to 
RNONE was also evident in each M1 individually (both p < 0.005, 
Wilcoxon sign rank test; n = 44 for MY and 13 sessions for MO). 
In contrast, in a non-social control in which M2 was replaced 
with a collecting bottle (chair/juice control; see Materials and 
Methods), the error rates for responding to cues predicting 
reward to other (ROTHER) and reward to no one (RNONE) were 
statistically indistinguishable (p = 0.20, Wilcoxon sign rank test; 
n = 9 sessions; Figure 2B).
The  presence  of  another  monkey  clearly  influenced  error 
rates during conditioning. M1 made fewer errors overall in the 
non-social control compared to the social trials (total error rates: 
15.5 ± 3.8% versus 47.6 ± 2.5%, p < 0.00001, Wilcoxon rank sum test; 
n = 57; Figure 2A). The higher error rates on the social compared 
to the non-social control trials could be attributed to increased 
attentional demands due to the presence of another monkey (e.g., 
bystander effect). Error rates during the conditioning trials dem-
onstrate that rhesus monkeys value rewards to self more than they 
value rewards to others, as expected. Nonetheless, the fact that M1 
continued to participate when only M2 was rewarded directly with 
juice suggests that observing another monkey receive a reward is 
vicariously reinforcing.
A
B
Monkey
Chair / juice
Partner Type
E
r
r
o
r
 
r
a
t
e
 
(
%
)
d
u
r
i
n
g
 
c
o
n
d
i
t
i
o
n
i
n
g
 
t
r
i
a
l
s
Cued reward outcome
M1
M2
M1
M2 M2
M1
RSELF RBOTH ROTHER RNONE
M1
M2
 
100
80
60
40
20
0
E
r
r
o
r
 
r
a
t
e
 
(
%
)
 
d
u
r
i
n
g
 
c
o
n
d
i
t
i
o
n
i
n
g
 
t
r
i
a
l
s
Cued reward outcome
M1
M2
M1
M2 M2
M1 M1
M2
 
100
80
60
40
20
0
RSELF RBOTH ROTHER RNONE
Figure 2 | error patterns during instrumental conditioning demonstrate 
rhesus macaques are sensitive to other’s rewards. (A) Error rates 
(excluding first sessions) on the instrumental conditioning trials (mean of 
sessions ± SEM) in M1–M2 conditions (n = 57 sessions). (B) Error rates in the 
non-social (M1–C/J) controls (n = 9 sessions). Same format as in (A).Frontiers in Neuroscience  | Decision Neuroscience    March 2011  | Volume 5  | Article 27  |  6
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socIal varIaBles Influence vIcarIous reInforceMent
The  magnitudes  of  the  VRI  were  idiosyncratic  to  individual 
pairs of monkeys. Such differences were apparent from the very 
beginning of testing and remained more or less stable (Figure 4). 
We tested whether a specific social variable could explain this 
individual variability. First, we examined social status, which is 
known to influence social behaviors in both young children and 
non-human animals (Hawley, 1999), and observational learning 
has been implicated in how monkeys acquire social hierarchical 
information (Cheney and Seyfarth, 1990). We found that M1 was 
more willing to share reward if M1 was dominant to M2 in the 
Self/Both context (n = 4 out of 8). Specifically, M1 was more likely 
to choose RBOTH in the Self/Both context [VRI: −0.54 ± 0.03 (M1 
is dominant) versus −0.65 ± 0.03 (M1 is subordinate), p < 0.01, 
Wilcoxon rank sum test], but not necessarily ROTHER in the Other/
None context (0.62 ± 0.02 versus 0.58 ± 0.04, p = 0.57, Wilcoxon 
rank sum test), if M1 is dominant to M2.
Second, we examined whether the familiarity of individuals in 
each pair biased choices by analyzing the housing locations of M1 
relative to M2 in the colony room, which served as our measure of 
familiarity. It has been documented that social interaction behav-
iors increase with familiarity in both humans and monkeys (Preston 
and de Waal, 2002). We therefore reasoned that monkeys who could 
directly view each other (housed on opposite sides, compared to on 
same sides) would be more familiar and thus more likely to reward 
others. We found that VRI in the Other/None context was higher if 
M1 and M2 were housed on opposite sides (n = 4 out of 7) of the 
colony room, with direct visual access to each other. That is, M1 was 
more likely to choose ROTHER in the Other/None context [0.71 ± 0.02 
(opposite side) versus 0.53 ± 0.03 (same side), p < 0.0001, Wilcoxon 
rank sum test], but not necessarily RBOTH in the Self/Both context 
(−0.60 ± 0.03 versus −0.57 ± 0.02, p = 0.19, Wilcoxon rank sum test), 
if he could see him while in his home cage. Together, these find-
ings suggest that individual variability in vicarious reinforcement 
(Figures 3B and 4) is at least partially influenced by both social 
dominance and social familiarity, although our limited sample size 
and types preclude strong conclusions.
Monkeys oBserve the rewardInG events of others
After monkeys expressed their choice, they were permitted to freely 
look about (Figure 1B). During this free-viewing period, M1 often 
shifted gaze toward the face of M2, and the overall rate of shift-
ing gaze depended on the reward outcome for M1 [Figure 5A; 
20.5 ± 3.6% (median ± SEM of the average between ROTHER and 
RNONE) versus 3.0 ± 2.5% (RSELF and RBOTH), p < 0.00001, Wilcoxon 
sign rank test; n = 64 sessions]. Critically, however, M1 looked at 
M2 more frequently after choosing to reward him over no one in 
the Other/None condition (ROTHER, 25.4 ± 4.1%; RNONE, 16.7 ± 5.8%, 
p < 0.0005, Wilcoxon sign rank test). We found a significant effect 
(frequency of gaze after choosing ROTHER > RNONE) in both M1s 
separately [MY: 23.1 ± 1.6 versus 15.4 ± 2.3% (p < 0.005; n = 19); 
MO: 26.1 ± 5.6 versus 17.9 ± 8.1% (p < 0.01; n = 45), Wilcoxon 
sign rank test]. Thus, our observation confirms that there is a link 
between social attention and vicarious reinforcement.
By contrast, in the non-social control (n = 13 sessions), looking 
behavior was greatly reduced across all reward outcomes, compared 
to the social conditions (RSELF, ROTHER: p < 0.01; RBOTH: p = 0.12; RNONE: 
or RBOTH over RSELF (Self/Both condition) and 0 indicating indif-
ference (see Materials and Methods). Analysis of the index led 
to similar results. In the Other/None condition, M1 preferred 
to reward M2 (VRI: 0.60 ± 0.02, significantly different from 0, 
p < 0.00001, Wilcoxon sign rank test; n = 64 sessions; Figure 3B), 
and this pattern was absent in the non-social control (0.11 ± 0.08, 
p = 0.18, Wilcoxon sign rank test; n = 13; Figure 3B). In the 
Self/Both context, however, M1 preferred to withhold reward 
from M2 (−0.58 ± 0.02, p < 0.00001, Wilcoxon sign rank test; 
Figure 3B), and this pattern was only weakly evident in the non-
social control (0.06 ± 0.03, p = 0.06, Wilcoxon sign rank test; 
Figure 3B). Again, we observed the same pattern in each M1 
separately [Other/None context (MY and MO): 0.70 ± 0.03 and 
0.56 ± 0.03; Self/Both context: −0.65 ± 0.03 and −0.55 ± 0.02; all 
p < 0.00001, Wilcoxon sign rank test; n = 19 and 45, respectively]. 
These preferences remained stable over the course of data col-
lection (Figure 4). Crucially, the VRI indices in the Other/None 
and Self/Both contexts never crossed over.
Figure 3 | Context-dependent vicarious reinforcement drives the 
expression of other-regarding preferences in rhesus macaques. (A) Choice 
preferences (median of all sessions ± SEM) in the Other/None and Self/Both 
contexts across M1–M2 pairs (8 pairs, 64 session) and M1–chair/juice controls 
(2 pairs, 13 sessions). (B) Choice preferences expressed as VR indices 
(median of all sessions ± SEM) in the Other/None and Self/Both contexts 
across M1–M2 pairs (see box for individual pair medians and standard 
deviations (SDs) for their ranges) and M1–chair/juice controls. Bars are 
color-coded by the partner type in both panels (see box in A).
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RBOTH in the Self/Both condition and showed faster RT for choos-
ing RSELF, whereas M1 chose ROTHER over RNONE in the Other/None 
condition and showed faster RT for choosing ROTHER.
dIscussIon
We demonstrated that social preferences of rhesus macaques – non-
human primates that live in large, hierarchical, mixed-sex social 
groups and who last shared a common ancestor with humans some 
25 million years ago – could be shaped by vicarious reinforcement 
in a context-specific manner. Monkeys systematically preferred to 
provide juice reward to others rather than to no one, as if observing 
others drink is vicariously rewarding. In contrast, monkeys system-
atically withheld reward from others when confronted with the 
options to either consume reward alone or share reward. Increased 
social attention to M2 (i.e., the increased rate of gaze shift to M2) 
in the Other/None context corroborates enhanced vicarious rein-
forcement during social decision-making.
Rewarding the other monkey without any opportunity to reward 
self is a uniquely vicarious form of reward. Such vicarious rein-
forcement may be driven by an intrinsic tendency to observe the 
experience of others to gather information, as can occur in foraging 
(Cheney and Seyfarth, 1990; Valone and Templeton, 2002). It is pos-
sible, however, that monkeys simply find feedback to their actions 
intrinsically rewarding. For instance, choosing to reward others in 
the Other/None context is the only option that results in a salient 
feedback that could serve as a secondary reinforcer or confirmation 
that a chosen action has resulted in a noticeable change in the envi-
ronment. However, the preference to reward only self in the Self/
Both context makes this possibility less likely (although the actor 
monkeys may have been less interested in the other monkeys due 
to receiving reward or the competitiveness evoked by this context), 
since choosing to reward both would also result in salient feedback. 
Furthermore, the absence of preference in the non-social control 
trials indicates that mere actions that result in fluid delivery are 
not sufficient to drive vicarious reinforcement, suggesting that the 
presence of a social agent is required. Notably, however, monkeys 
still showed high error rates (71%) in the conditioning trials when 
p = 0.01, Wilcoxon rank sum test; Figure 5A). Critically, M1 neither 
looked at the juice bottle more often after choosing ROTHER over 
RNONE in the Other/None condition (p = 0.34, Wilcoxon sign rank 
test), nor after choosing RBOTH over RSELF in the Self/Both condition 
(p = 0.94, Wilcoxon sign rank test). The only factor that explained 
looking behavior in the non-social control was whether or not M1 
was directly rewarded with juice (RSELF and RBOTH versus ROTHER and 
RNONE, p < 0.0005, Wilcoxon rank sum test). Thus, reward consump-
tion by another monkey strongly recruits attention in the absence 
of direct reward to self, suggesting vicarious reinforcement may be 
mediated by social attention circuits in the brain (Klein et al., 2009).
saccade reactIon tIMes reveal the Internal delIBeratIve 
Process
The pattern of saccade RTs on choice trials further corroborates 
the hypothesis that rewarding self was more valued than any other 
alternatives (Figure 5B; RTs for RSELF < RBOTH < ROTHER < RNONE; all 
comparisons p < 0.00001, Wilcoxon sign rank; n = 64 sessions). 
Generally,  M1  responded  more  quickly  whenever  he  chose  to 
directly reward himself with juice. Nonetheless, M1 responded 
faster when he chose to reward M2 than when he chose to reward 
no one at all. These results were obtained for each M1 separately (all 
comparisons p < 0.01 for each M1, Wilcoxon sign rank test; n = 19 
and 45 sessions for MY and MO, respectively). Importantly, in the 
absence of M2 (non-social control; n = 13 sessions), RTs across dif-
ferent reward outcomes remained more or less flat (Figure 5A). RTs 
were indeed slower overall in the presence of M2, perhaps due to 
an additional attentional load induced by the presence of M2 (blue 
versus red traces in Figure 5B; all comparisons p < 0.005, except 
p = 0.46 for RSELF conditions, Wilcoxon rank sum test).
Given that monkeys generally respond more slowly when they 
anticipate smaller rewards (Kawagoe et al., 1998; Roesch and Olson, 
2004), we inferred the subjective reward value of the four condi-
tions to be RSELF > RBOTH and ROTHER > RNONE. These inferred sub-
jective reward values, which were absent in the non-social control 
(Figure 5B), predict the relative preferences between cues observed 
in the preference task (Figure 3). Specifically, M1 chose RSELF over 
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(Anderson and Mason, 1978). For instance, from an ecological 
standpoint, sharing food with other individuals always reduces 
the amount of potential food available to oneself. Moreover, 
reduced rates of attending to M2 in the Self/Both context may 
further mitigate vicarious reinforcement during social decision-
making. We observed a small but significant tendency to with-
hold less if actor monkeys were dominant to recipient monkeys, 
although our limited sample size and types preclude strong con-
clusions. This is consistent with a recent study in long-tailed 
macaques (M. fascicularis) showing that dominant macaques 
are more “prosocial” toward subordinates (Massen et al., 2010). 
Dominant monkeys might be more likely to engage in such posi-
tive other-regarding behaviors to sustain their rank and promote 
group cohesion, especially when there is no added cost, as in 
the Self/Both context. By extension, we would predict humans 
to choose to reward both individuals in an analogous monetary 
version of the Self/Both context, as long as the monetary reward 
was the same for both individuals and the amount of reward 
was undiminished by sharing (i.e., non-competitive situation). 
If the monkeys were clearly aware that they both always received 
the same amount of juice with an infinite amount of resources, 
they might also increase preferences to reward both monkeys. 
Alternatively, it is also plausible that the rhesus macaques, unlike 
humans, have a difficult time in ignoring their naturally com-
petitive cognitive set.
It is critical to emphasize the dramatic differences in pref-
erences  between  Self/Both  and  Other/None  contexts.  If  the 
actor monkeys always found it valuable to reward the recipient 
monkey, then we would have expected the monkeys to prefer 
to reward both in the Self/Both context. Alternatively, if the 
monkeys always found rewards delivered to the other monkey 
to be aversive, perhaps due to perceived competition, then we 
would have expected the monkeys to prefer to reward none in 
the Other/None context. Instead, we observed a clean disso-
ciation of preferences depending on social context, suggesting 
that different reward contingencies strongly influenced deci-
sions. This is consistent with our findings that RTs, frequency 
of attention directed to the other monkey, and error rates were 
clearly different between choosing to reward both and choosing 
to only reward other. (Please also see our response above for 
situation-specific social behaviors in humans and monkeys.) The 
behavioral and neural mechanisms responsible for such context-
dependent social decision-making would provide new insights 
into the social flexibility characterizing the behavior of macaques 
and other primates, including humans.
We  hypothesize  that  vicarious  experiences  are  processed  as 
rewarding signals in the brain, and are mediated by neurons in 
homologous circuits governing social perception and reward learn-
ing in non-human primates and humans (Bandura and Rosenthal, 
1966; Fehr and Camerer, 2007; Lohrenz et al., 2007; Lee, 2008; 
Hayden et al., 2009; Mobbs et al., 2009). One plausible mechanism 
is that the overlapping populations of neurons respond both to 
rewards to self and rewards to another individual. Such vicari-
ous reward could motivate social interactions as well as underlie 
observational  learning  and  mutualistic  behaviors  such  as  alli-
ance formation, social grooming, and group cohesion (Fehr and 
Fischbacher, 2003; Takahashi et al., 2009). Modulation of vicarious 
the visual cues predicted reward to other monkey only. Interestingly, 
the error rates were much lower (<13%) when monkeys confronted 
a choice between Other/None in the preference task. This is con-
sistent with observations that rhesus macaques are much more 
motivated when making voluntary choices compared to making 
simple operant responses (Suzuki, 1999). Still, the atypically large 
error rates observed in the conditioning trials seems to be consistent 
with the competitiveness of rhesus macaques, and may highlight 
differences between humans and rhesus macaques (also see below).
In contrast, any of the two available options from the Self/Both 
context results in direct fluid reward. The preference to withhold 
reward from others in this particular context may reflect a poten-
tial diminishment of reward during simultaneous consumption, 
possibly due to the uncertainty of the quantity or quality of 
reward delivered to others. Reward withholding behavior may 
also arise from rhesus monkeys’ natural   competitive tendencies 
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process. (A) The frequency of gaze shifts (%; median ± SEM of individual 
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fundamental cognitive mechanisms that evolved early in the primate 
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reward signals by social variables such as dominance or familiarity 
could further provide a mechanism promoting socially adaptive 
behavior toward specific individuals.
Observing  rewarding  events  of  others  has  been  shown  to 
systematically and effectively modulate neural activity in classic 
reward areas in humans, including ventral striatum, ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex, and anterior cingulate cortex (Mobbs et al., 
2009; Lombardo et al., 2010). Moreover, the anterior cingulate 
cortex has been implicated in evaluating social information with 
respect to others (Takahashi et al., 2009). Dorsolateral and ven-
tromedial prefrontal cortices in humans have been implicated 
in observing an action and observing reward outcome of oth-
ers, respectively (Burke et al., 2010). Observational fear condi-
tioning in mice depends on affective pain circuitry including 
anterior cingulated cortex (Jeon et al., 2010). Activation of these 
neural circuits by vicarious outcomes may be the neural sub-
strate that ultimately promotes empathy and altruism, as well as 
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